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Widely available web 2.0 technologies not only bring rich and interactive user experiences, but also easily
help users advertise products or services on their own blogs and social network webpages. Online referral
marketing, for example, is a business practice that rewards customers who successfully refer other customers
to a website or upon completion of a sale usually via their own social contacts. The referral rewards come in
different forms such as shopping vouchers, redeemable points, discounts, prizes, cash payments, etc.We develop
an analyticalmodel to evaluate the business potential of incorporating an online referralmarketing program into
the firm's product selling strategies. Under different demand dynamics, we investigate the optimal decision
making including the pricing and referral strategies to maximize the seller's profitability. We find that,
under simple decision making environment such as fixed product price and myopic strategy, different demand
dynamics yield the same prediction of the referral payment, which turns out to be a static policy. However, under
complex market situations, both the optimal product pricing and referral offering critically depend on the
demand side dynamics. Under the nonlinear demand dynamics, the referral payment is an all-or-nothing
decision throughout the product selling horizon. In contrast, under the linear demand assumption, the referral
payment can be partially offered in initial phase of the product introduction. We further offer some managerial
insights to guide practical implementation of the online referral marketing strategy.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Although the rapid development of digital technologies has easily
transformed loyal customers to brand advocates, the idea of offering
rewards to motivate current customers to refer other customers is not
new. PayPal offered financial incentive to have members recommend
members. The company acquired more than three million users in its
first nine months of operation. Many telecommunication companies
offer discounts and vouchers to customers who help them recruit new
subscribers. Credit card companies offer coupons, redeemable points
or cash rewards to those customers when a referred friend signs up a
service. Today, increasingly more referral reward programs have been
designed to motivate consumers or other businesses to refer products
or services to potential customers. The most prominent is the affiliate
marketing used by Amazon and Google advertising, inwhich a business
rewards their affiliates for each visitor or customer brought about by the
affiliate's marketing efforts.
As opposed to traditional marketing strategies that use business-to-
consumer communication to disseminate information about a product
or service, new marketing practices take advantage of consumer-
to-consumer connections. RadicalBuy (http://apps.facebook.com/
radicalbuy/) was an innovative Facebook application that empowers
individual users to effortlessly set up their own virtual storefront in
Facebook and share their items anywhere on the web. In addition
to its fundamental buying and selling functions, it allows users to
list and sell friends' items to earn commission. Although RadicalBuy.com
and all widget services were discontinued in November 2010, the
novel aspect of this business model is the combination of social net-
working with consumer-to-consumer commerce. Referral in online
social networks is effective because it carries immediate credibility,
which has much more impact than a direct mail or advertising
campaign, especially for a niche business. The enhanced word of
mouth (WOM) effect in social networks helps create solid sales oppor-
tunities that are unavailable in traditional selling channels. It is among
the easiest, most cost-effective ways to gain new business leads.
As the Internet empowers consumers to share ideas and spread of
word of mouth, online channels are increasingly recognized as an
important vehicle to influence the adoption and use of products
and services. New online referral strategies leverage consumer-to-
consumer interactivity, taking new forms such as blogs, news groups,
product reviews, and social networking sites. Available information
technologies have also changed the landscape ofmanymarketing activ-
ities, expanding the reach of individual sellers to customers. For ex-
ample, an online seller can easily set up a system that seamlessly
integrates referrals into her marketing plan. The seller can offer refer-
rals for other online customers by using Web analytics applications,
such as Microsoft FastCounter Pro, to easily track user traffic. Such
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software not only automates the referral process, but tells which sites
are referring the most lucrative traffic, so the seller can make the most
of affiliate links to cost effectively grow their business.
Since a referral reward is only offered when a referral turns into a
sale, a referral strategy is recognized as an effective business marketing
strategy because of the “pay for performance” incentive. While the
potential of referral to effectively reach out to a broad set of users is
attracting considerable attention, the business value of this approach
is yet demonstrated. On the one hand, tangible referral rewards can
motivate existing consumers to introduce new customers to the
business at a low acquisition cost. On the other hand, rewards can
sometimes be given to customers who would have recommended
the product anyway, leading to a waste of advertising resources.
Even if a high referral reward may increase the likelihood of making
referrals, the seller has to trade off the benefit of additional sales and
the total cost of referral payment. The fact that formal referral programs
are only offered in certain products or markets shows that this strategy
may not always be beneficial. There needs to be a better understanding
of the contexts inwhich online referral programworks. This paper aims
to bridge this research gap.
In this paper, we develop an analytical framework to helpmanagers
make optimal decisions in their online referral marketing practice.
Based upon the seminal Bass diffusionmodel [1], we explicitly consider
the use of referral reward to influence WOM marketing. The seller's
optimal decision has to trade off the gain through the additional
sales generated by enhancedWOMmarketing and the cost of making
referral payment. We find that, under simple decision making envi-
ronment such as fixed product price and myopic strategy, different
demand dynamics yield the same prediction of the referral payment,
which turns out to be a static policy. However, under complex market
situations, both the optimal product pricing and referral payment
critically depend on the demand side dynamics. Under the nonlinear
demand dynamics, the referral offering is an all-or-nothing decision
throughout the product selling horizon. In contrast, under the linear
demand assumption, referral reward can be partially offered in initial
phase of the product introduction. These findings provide important
guidelines to implement the online referral marketing strategy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a
brief literature review. In Section 3, we introduce our analytical frame-
work based on widely adopted demand models in the literature. As a
benchmark model, we analyze the optimal pricing strategy without
referral reward in Section 4. In Section 5, we study the optimal referral
strategy under the case of fixed product price. Section 6 investigates the
optimal mix of pricing and referral payment schemes. Section 7 further
offersmoremarketing insights based on a numerical study.We summa-
rize our results and provide managerial insights in Section 8.
2. Literature review
Traditionally, WOMmarketing refers to the passing of information
from person to person [24]. The computer mediated environment has
significantly expanded the scale and scope of influence. One particu-
larly cost-effective way of disseminating the marketing message is
called e-referral marketing, in which consumers are willing to become
promoters of a product or service and spread the word to their friends.
E-referral marketing is a specific form of viral marketing (the word
“viral” suggests that information spreads automatically [23]). Viralmar-
keting also belongs to one category of onlineword-of-mouthmarketing
[13], which is referred to as electronic or e-word-of-mouth (e-WOM)
marketing [10]. The e-WOM marketing effort may not only increase
brand awareness, but motivate direct purchases.
Since referral is an effective marketing strategy of introducing new
customers at a low acquisition cost, companies are increasingly aware
of the need to manage customer referral reward programs [3]. Based
on data in the insurance industry, Law [16] identified that trust, in-
cluding credibility and benevolence, is the key element in the
process of developing closer relational strength and shared value.
Building upon theory of customer satisfaction, Biyalogorsky et al.
[2] studied the optimal combination of reward and price that will
lead to the most profitable referrals. They found that the optimal
mix of price and referral reward falls into three regions and critically
depend on customer delight. When customers are easy to delight,
then lowering prices without referral may be optimal. If customer
delight threshold is in an intermediate level, a seller should use a re-
ward to complement a low-price strategy. When the delight threshold
is very high, the seller should forsake the referral strategy all together.
Though interesting, their model is a static model that does not answer
such practical questions as how to adjust the optimal mix of price and
referral reward as new market conditions emerge.
In a dynamic setting, prior studies have examined the diffusion of
innovations and the transmission of ideas in social networks [17]. Due
to the reduced communication cost, increased reach of influence, and
the flexibility to deploy a variety of influence strategies through infor-
mation technologies, online networks become a considerably com-
pelling channel for knowledge-sharing and information transfer.
Because information spreads rapidly on the Internet, viral marketing
campaigns have the potential to reach large number of customers in
a short period of time [5]. Companies are interested in understanding
how marketers can influence the process through marketing activities.
Van der Lans et al. [22] developed a viral branching dynamic model
for predicting the spread of electronic word of mouth. The model is
applied to a real world campaign and is used to evaluate alternative
business scenarios.
Dynamicmodels for durable newproduct introduction can be traced
back to the original work of the Bass diffusion model [1]. Subsequent
works in the diffusion of innovation literature examined optimal
dynamic pricing strategies in the presence of WOM [12]. Majority of
marketing research in this line focuses on pricing as single decision
variable. No insight is offered about how to set product price and refer-
ral reward simultaneously to optimize performance. An increasing
number of studies in Information Systems (IS) literature focus on dy-
namic models in the context of open source software diffusion [25],
knowledge management adoption and assessment [11], diffusion of
innovation within social networks [15], and measuring influence in
customer networks [14]. We develop a model to investigate how a
seller should use a combination of referral reward and product pricing
strategy to determine the optimal product introduction and subsequent
market development. Our model sheds new light on both marketing
and IS literature by considering how referral reward would influence
online WOM communication and the likelihood of purchase in net-
worked markets. The dynamic nature of our model also suggests
changing strategies for more effective customer referral management,
which enriches the existing literature that largely rely on static analysis.
3. Market dynamics and decision models
In this section, we formulate our analytical model based on two
specifications of demand dynamics that are widely used in the mar-
keting literature. To establish a performance benchmark, we first pre-
sent a base model and analyze the seller's pricing strategy when
solely relying on the traditional WOM communication (call it the
base model or the traditional marketing model). We then consider a
monopolist seller who can potentially use an online referral market-
ing campaign to promote a new product through its tangible reward
program (call it the referral marketing model). A complete summary
of notation is provided in Appendix A.
3.1. Assumptions
Assume the population size is N. In our dynamic model, the state
of the system at time t is the total number of sales by time t, or the
number of customers who have already adopted the product at time
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t. We denote it as x(t) in the base model and z(t) in the online referral
marketing model.
The sales rate or demand dynamics governs the system evolution
over time. Define the sales rate at time t as the likelihood of purchase
P(t) multiplied by the demand rate q(t), where q(t) is the quantity
demanded by consumers at time t. In the following, we describe the
likelihood of purchase and two possible demand dynamics.
3.1.1. Likelihood of purchase
Under the traditional WOM marketing, the classical Bass model
provides intuitively appealing assumptions to model the likelihood
of purchase [1]. According to Bass, the total likelihood of purchase
among the population is P(t)=α+γx(t), where αN0 is interpreted
as coefficient of innovation and γN0 the coefficient of imitation. Ac-
cordingly, consumers can be classified into two groups. The first
group of consumers are innovators who make independent purchase
decisions with probability α. The second group of consumers are im-
itators whose purchase decisions are influenced by the action of their
peer consumers. Therefore, the likelihood of purchase in the second
group, γx(t), is proportionally affected by the number of consumers
who have already purchased the product. The imitation effect is also
known as the WOM effect in the literature. Note that the choice of α
and γ should ensure that α+γN≤1 so that the condition 0bP(t)≤1
can be satisfied.
Under the online referral marketing model, the seller offers a per
unit referral payment m(t)N0 for consumers who have successfully
referred other consumers to buy the product. The traditional WOM
effect γ is therefore enhanced to γ+βm(t), where parameter β mea-
sures howeffective the referral payment canmotivateWOMmarketing.
We call it the coefficient of referral. The additional term βm(t) reflects
the total market responsiveness to the online referral marketing
strategy. That is, as the referral effectiveness factor β or the referral
payment m(t) increases, the likelihood of purchase by imitators in-
creases. Note that, whenm(t)=0, the online referral marketing strate-
gy degenerates to the traditional WOM marketing strategy. Again, we
need to ensure that 0bα+(γ+βm(t))N≤1. Solving this inequality
we havem tð Þ≤ 1β 1−αN −γ
 
.
3.1.2. Linear demand dynamics
Assume that each consumer will only demand one unit of the
product. Recall the population size is N. It can be interpreted as the
maximum market potential. Since x(t) is the number of customers
who have already adopted the product at time t in the traditional
marketing model, N−x(t) is the remaining market potential, i.e.,
the time-varying remaining market potential that can be captured
when price is set to zero.
Linear demand functions have been used in various static analysis
[18] and dynamic models [19,8,9]. Let p(t) be the product selling price
at time t. Following [9], we adopt the following linear demand func-
tion: q(t)=N−x(t)−θp(t). Note here that the coefficient θ measures
the price sensitivity to demand.
Denote x˙ tð Þ ¼ dx tð Þdt as the instantaneous sales rate at time t under
the traditional WOM marketing strategy. The demand dynamics can
be expressed as the following differential equation:
x˙ tð Þ ¼ αþ γx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þ−θp tð Þð Þ; ð1Þ
Similarly, let z(t) and z˙ tð Þ ¼ dz tð Þdt be the total cumulative sales and
the instantaneous sales rate at time t, respectively, under the online
referral marketing strategy. z(t) consists of both online referral-
based sales and sales naturally occur under traditional WOM commu-
nication. Denote y(t) and y˙ tð Þ ¼ dy tð Þdt as the cumulative sales and in-
stantaneous sales rate at time t through the online referral program,
respectively.
Based on consumer utility theory, Chiang and Guo [4] have shown
that all WOM sales would be incentive-based sales when consumers
do not discount their referral utility. That is, if there is no negative
consequence associated with making money through referral, con-
sumers would simply prefer to get paid rather than not being
rewarded. This can happen when the business is completely run
online such as software that requires special installation or digital
music that is distributed through a peer-to-peer system. The seller
can easily and reliably track and monitor the WOM communica-
tion, so the seller may reward all WOM sales accordingly. The de-
mand dynamics can be expressed as:
y˙ tð Þ ¼ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ N−z tð Þ−θp tð Þð Þ
z˙ tð Þ ¼ αþ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þð Þ N−z tð Þ−θp tð Þð Þ

ð2Þ
Note that there is an enhancement in the WOM sales brought by
the online referral program. The higher the referral offering, the
more likely early adopters would actively promote the word-of-
mouth sales. So the total sales would increase. When m(t) is zero,
the online referral demand dynamics (2) degenerates to the tradi-
tional marketing demand dynamics (1).
3.1.3. Nonlinear demand dynamics
Nonlinear demand function can be expressed in different forms,
such as quadratic and exponential. In the marketing literature, the
following demand dynamics has been assumed by [20,7,12], among
others.
x˙ tð Þ ¼ e−sp tð Þ αþ γx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ; ð3Þ
where parameter s measures the demand elasticity that is propor-
tional to price. This is the demand dynamics under the traditional
WOM marketing strategy.
Similarly, under the online referral marketing strategy, the market
demand model is expressed as:
y˙ tð Þ ¼ e−sp tð Þ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ N−z tð Þð Þ
z˙ tð Þ ¼ e−sp tð Þ αþ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þð Þ N−z tð Þð Þ
(
ð4Þ
The following table summarizes our model setup under different
market scenarios.
3.2. Decision models
As shown in Table 1, we consider two decision models. The base
model refers to the traditional WOM marketing where no referral re-
ward is offered by the seller. The online referral marketing model re-
fers to the business practice that a firm offers referral payment to
consumers as an effort to enhance WOM marketing.
In the base model, subject to the demand dynamics (1) and (3), the
seller's objective is to choose the optimal pricing strategy p(t) to maxi-
mize her overall discounted profit over a finite planning horizon T:
πB ¼ Max
p tð Þ
∫
T
0
e−ρtp tð Þx˙ tð Þdt ð5Þ
Table 1
Model setup under different demand dynamics and marketing strategies.
Demand dynamics Linear demand rate Nonlinear demand rate
Base model
x˙ tð Þ ¼ P tð Þq tð Þ
P tð Þ ¼ αþ γx tð Þ ð1Þ
q tð Þ ¼ N−x tð Þ−θp tð Þ
P tð Þ ¼ αþ γx tð Þ ð3Þ
q tð Þ ¼ e−sp tð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ
Referral model
ż(t)=P(t)q(t)
P tð Þ ¼ αþ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ ð2Þ
q tð Þ ¼ N−z tð Þ−θp tð Þ
P tð Þ ¼ αþ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ ð4Þ
q tð Þ ¼ e−sp tð Þ N−z tð Þð Þ
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The seller's objective in the online referral marketing model is to
choose an optimal pricing strategy p(t) and a referral paymentm(t) that
collectively maximize her overall discounted profit over a finite planning
horizon T, subject to the demand dynamics in Eqs. (2) or (4):
πR ¼ Max
p tð Þ;m tð Þ
∫
T
0
e−ρt p tð Þz˙ tð Þ−m tð Þy˙ tð Þð Þdt ð6Þ
where ρ≥0 is the discount rate that is used to calculate the present
discounted value of profit. If thefirmprefers profit to be earned in the cur-
rent period rather than in future periods, the discount rate ρN0. A higher
discount rate implies that the firm prefers more profits to be earned now
than later.
Also note that, in the seller's objective function in Eq. (6), the first
term is the gross profit rate and the second term is the referral pay-
ment rate. We do not explicitly model the cost of production. For
physical products, we may interpret p(t) as the desired profit margin
(the unit selling price minus the constant unit production cost) by the
seller. For digital products, since almost all production related costs
are sunk cost, we assume the marginal production cost is zero.
We employ the optimal control method to analyze the model. In
Section 4, we focus on optimal pricing in the base model where no re-
ferral payment is offered. In Sections 5 and 6, we analyze the optimal
referral scheme under fixed and dynamic pricing strategies, respec-
tively, in the online referral marketing model.
4. The base model
In the base model the seller optimizes total discounted profit char-
acterized by Eq. (5). We compare two pricing strategies: myopic and
forward-looking. At any time, a myopic pricing strategy maximizes
the instantaneous profit without considering the impact of current
strategy on the profit in future periods. In contrast, a forward-looking
pricing strategy takes into account the effect of current period sales
on future demand growth and market profitability. Generally speaking,
the forward-looking strategy outperforms the myopic strategy because
it considers the inter-temporal strategic tradeoff. We use the myopic
pricing as a benchmark to compare with the forward-looking pricing
strategy. The performance difference can be seen as the benefit of stra-
tegic planning and system thinking in a dynamic environment rather
than a static analysis at any decision point.
4.1. Myopic pricing
Following the new product introduction literature, we assume there
is no demand at the beginning of the planning horizon (i.e., x(0)=0).
The following table compares the pricing and sales patterns under the
two demand assumptions. Calculation of these results is presented in
Appendix B.
We see that the myopic pricing strategy is different under differ-
ent demand dynamics, formally stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. If the demand rate is linear, the myopic pricing strategy
follows a monotonically decreasing pattern over time; if the demand rate
is nonlinear, the myopic pricing adopts a constant pricing strategy.
Although the pricing strategy is different, the sales rate peaks
when the cumulative sales reach the same level. Since eN2, compar-
ing the sales peak times we see that the sales peaks earlier under
the nonlinear demand. So the market penetration is more aggressive
under the nonlinear demand.
4.2. Forward-looking pricing
The following proposition characterizes the pricing pattern under
forward-looking pricing. For the special case in which the firm does
not discount future profits at a positive rate (i.e., ρ=0), we can derive
the following results.
Proposition 2. a) If the demand rate is linear, the optimal pricing path
has the following properties:
1) If αb γN2 , then the optimal price increases when xb
N−θp
3 − 2α3γ, and
decreases when xN N−θp3 − 2α3γ. The price will peak at the point
xˆ
f
l ¼ N−θp3 − 2α3γ.
2) If α≥ γN2 , then the optimal price decreases monotonically.
b) If the demand rate is nonlinear, the optimal pricing path has the fol-
lowing properties:
1) If αbγN, then the optimal price increases when x tð Þb 12 N− αγ
 
,
and decreases when x tð ÞN 12 N− αγ
 
. The price will peak at the
point xˆ
f
n ¼ 12 N− αγ
 
where the maximum market penetration
also occurs.
2) If α≥γN, then the optimal price decreases monotonically.
Comparing a) and b) in Proposition 2 we find that xˆ
f
nNxˆ
f
l . It implies
that at the time of price peaks, the cumulative sales in market with
nonlinear demand is higher than that with linear demand.
We also see that the pricing pattern critically depends on the rela-
tionship between the coefficient of innovation, coefficient of imita-
tion, and the total market potential. When the imitation effect is
relatively high (i.e., αγ b
N
2), there is a price increasing period under
both linear and nonlinear demand dynamics. When the innovation
effect is relatively high (i.e., αγ NN), the optimal price decreases
under both linear and nonlinear demand dynamics. However, when
the imitation effect is intermediate, (i.e., N2 b
α
γ bN), then the optimal
pricing curve monotonically decreases in markets with linear demand
assumption but first increases and then decreases in markets with
nonlinear demand assumption. This is in sharp contrast to the myopic
pricing strategies characterized in Proposition 1.
Dean [6] discussed two pricing strategies for the innovating firm
to adopt before facing eventual competition. A skim pricing policy of-
fers high initial prices followed by lower prices. A penetration pricing
policy uses low initial prices to get into mass market early. Dolan and
Jeuland [7] further found that, during the period of monopoly, a skim
pricing policy is optimal if the demand curve is stable over time. In
contrast, a penetration pricing policy is optimal if a durable good's de-
mand is characterized by a diffusion process. If the total market size N
is large enough or the market imitation effect is relatively large, con-
ditions in Proposition 2 a1) and b1) hold. Our model suggests a pen-
etration pricing strategy. Furthermore, our results show that, if the
seller adopts a skim pricing policy, then very likely the market inno-
vation effect is relatively large or the seller follows a myopic strategy
under linear demand dynamics.
Table 2
Pricing and sales patterns under myopic strategy.
Characteristics Linear demand Nonlinear demand
Optimal price at t pml tð Þ ¼ N2θ− 1−e
− αþγNð Þt2
2θ 1N þγαe
− αþγNð Þt2
  pmn tð Þ ¼ 1s
Cumulative sales at t xml tð Þ ¼ 1−e
− αþγNð Þt2
1
N þγαe
− αþγNð Þt2
xmn tð Þ ¼ 1−e
−αþγNe t
1
N þyαe−
αþγN
e t
Cum. sales at max. diffusion
rates
xˆ
m
l ¼ N2 − α2γ xˆ
m
n ¼ N2 − α2γ
Sales peak time tˆ
m
l ¼ 2ln
γN
α
αþγN tˆ
m
n ¼ eαþγN ln γNα
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5. Online referral marketing with fixed price
In reality, many product prices are relatively stable over time. The
seller may use other marketing tools such as coupons and promotions
to effectively influence sales. In this section, we assume the product
price is fixed and examine the seller's optimal referral payment strat-
egy under the two demand assumptions. The fixed price assumption
will be relaxed in the next section.
5.1. Myopic strategy
Assume the product selling price is fixed at p over the entire plan-
ning horizon. The seller considers varying referral payment to influence
WOM and its effect on sales. It turns out that the optimal myopic strat-
egy is characterized by a static policy under both the linear and the non-
linear demand dynamics, formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the product price is fixed, then the myopic referral
strategy is a static policy determined by
mm tð Þ ¼ p
2
− γ
2β
ð7Þ
under both linear and nonlinear demand dynamics.
Note that the condition mm(t)≥0 requires that p≥ γβ. Holding other
factors constant, this suggests that the product unit price should be
high enough to justify a formal referral program. Moreover, the thresh-
old γβ increases as β decreases. It further implies that, if the online
referral marketing is not very responsive to market demand dynamics,
only high price products can afford a referral marketing campaign.
It is a coincidence that the myopic referral strategy is the same
under the two demand dynamics. This is in contrast to the optimal
myopic pricing strategies in Section 4.1. Interestingly, under different
demand dynamics, the myopic seller who would adopt different pric-
ing strategies may come up with the same referral policy.
5.2. Forward-looking strategy
A forward-looking seller will consider the impact of earlier adop-
tion on later sales. The seller's optimization problem is characterized
in Eq. (6) subject to demand dynamics specified in Eqs. (2) and (4),
respectively. Denote Z−1 as the inverse function of the cumulative
sales z(t). We have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. a) Under the linear demand assumption, suppose
NNθpþ αγ and z Tð ÞN N−θp2 , there exists t˜ l∈ 0; Tð Þ such that the optimal
referral payment is non-increasing fort∈ 0; t˜ l
 
and non-decreasing for
t∈ t˜ l; T
 
, where
t˜ l ¼ Z−1
N−θp
2
−2β ρμ l þ θpþ μ lð Þαð Þ
γþ β θpþ μ lð Þð Þ2
" #
: ð8Þ
b) Under the nonlinear demand assumption, suppose NN αγ and z Tð ÞN N2,
there exists t˜ n∈ 0; Tð Þsuch that the optimal referral payment is non-
increasing for t∈ 0; t˜ n
 
and non-decreasing for t∈ t˜ n; T
 
, where
t˜n ¼ Z−1
N
2
−2β e
spρμ n þ pþ μ nð Þα
 
γþ β pþ μ nð Þð Þ2
" #
: ð9Þ
Proposition 4a) implies that, as long as the planning horizon is
long enough for sufficient market penetration (i.e., z Tð ÞN N−θp2 ), and
the total market potential is large enough (NNθpþ αγ), the optimal
referral payment will generally feature a decreasing and then increas-
ing pattern (non-monotonically). The insight for the decreasing trend
at the beginning is to offer high incentive for initial market develop-
ment. The intuition for the increasing trend near the end of the selling
horizon is to pick up the remaining market potential.
Although the conditions are different under different demand dy-
namics, the optimal referral payment pattern is similar. Generally a
forward-looking seller would decrease referral payment at the initial
phase of market development, but increase the referral payment near
the end of the selling horizon. The referral payment tends to be low in
the middle of the product planning horizon. As opposed to the first
increasing and then decreasing pricing path characterized by Proposi-
tion 2, the incentive payment path characterized by Proposition 4
shows the reverse trend. Of course, the conditions are quite different
as well.
6. Optimal pricing and referral strategies
It is well documented in the literature that elegant closed form so-
lutions to complicated optimal control problems are few [21]. Since
the system dynamics are very complicated under the general model,
we are only able to derive analytical insights under certain conditions.
Proposition 5 characterizes the relationship between the optimal pric-
ing and referral payment paths under the myopic strategy. Under the
nonlinear demand assumption, Proposition 6 states conditions under
which the online referral marketing model is preferable to the base
model. Proposition 7 states market conditions where both the optimal
price and referral payment increase. Finally, we use a numerical exam-
ple to show that the pricing and referral strategies could dramatically
differ under different demand assumptions.
Proposition 5. Under the myopic strategy, the rate of change in referral
payment is half of the rate of change in price (i.e., m˙ ¼ p˙2) under both
linear and nonlinear demand dynamics.
This result shows that the myopic seller will synchronize her stra-
tegic pricing and referral payment. When price increases (decreases),
the referral payment increases (decreases) at the same time. The rate
of change for referral payment is half of the scale of the rate of change
for product price. This finding is consistent with the current business
practice. The rate for affiliates doing affiliate marketing nowadays is
about 10–60% of the item price. When the item price changes, so
does the referral payment. The change in item price affects the change
in referral payment with a predefined percentage.
Apparently, the myopic referral strategy is simple to be executed
in practice, but may not be optimal. The following proposition states
some properties for the forward-looking strategy.
Proposition 6. Under the nonlinear demand assumption, if β≤sγ, then
it is optimal not to offer referral payment; if βNsγ, then it is optimal to
offer referral payment. Moreover, the referral marketing program has
the following feature:
a) the referral payment m(t) monotonically increases over the entire
planning horizon;
b) the price p(t) monotonically increases when t≤Z−1 N2 − αγ
 
.
Proposition 6 predicts that the strategy to use referral marketing
critically depends on three key parameters: the coefficient of referral ef-
fectiveness β, the demand elasticity s, and the imitation coefficient γ. In
general, if β is strongly responsive such that its effect is greater than the
multiplicative effect of sγ, then it is optimal to adopt the referral mar-
keting campaign over the entire product planning horizon. Moreover,
the referral offering increases as the market is further penetrated. The
non-decreasing referral payment shows the synergy between the non-
linear demand dynamics and the referral-based WOM sales.
In contrast, when the response to referral is not strong enough
(i.e., βbsγ), then it is optimal not to launch the referral marketing
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program. The intuition is that the seller finds it impossible to generate
enough referral-based WOM sales to counterbalance its referral
payment.
If deciding to use the referral marketing strategy, the seller would
increase both the product price and the referral payment in the initial
stage of market development. The increasing trend at least continues
until the market penetration reaches almost half of the total market
potential. This pricing pattern is consistent with the penetration pric-
ing strategy discussed in the marketing literature.
Generally, p(t) exhibits a first increasing, then decreasing pattern.
Although it is impossible to derive clean analytical solutions, our nu-
merical study shows that the price curve is well behaved. The in-
crease and decrease are monotonic, and the peak time is unique.
Fig. 1 illustrates the optimal pricing and referral strategies (left
panel) and sales dynamics (right panel) under the linear (denoted
as L) and nonlinear demand (denoted as N) assumptions. The figure
is plotted with parameter values α=0.6, β=0.06, γ=0.08, ρ=0.1,
s=0.4, N=10, and T=10. The total cumulative sales under the linear
and nonlinear demand dynamics are 9.13 and 8.76, respectively. The
total discounted profits are 30.52 and 24.91, respectively.
We see that, although both the cumulative sales patterns and the
incremental sales rate patterns are similar under the two demand as-
sumptions, the pricing and referral payment strategies are quite dif-
ferent. In this example, it is profitable to offer referral payment.
Consistent with the prediction of Proposition 6 for nonlinear demand
dynamics, it is optimal to increase referral over the entire product
planning horizon. Under the linear demand assumption, in contrast,
the optimal referral scheme started at similar level, decreased over
time, and dropped to zero around T=2. The seller did not find it ben-
eficial to offer referral payment in later stage of the planning horizon.
The pricing patterns are also different. Under the linear demand
dynamics, the optimal pricing strategy is to decrease the product
price over the entire product planning horizon. Under the nonlinear
demand dynamics, however, the price first increases when the total
number of cumulative sales is low, and then decreases.
Note that Fig. 1 is just for illustrative purpose. We demonstrate that,
although the sales patterns might be similar, the pricing and referral
strategies could dramatically differ under different demand dynamics.
Other pricing and sales patterns exist. In next section,we systematically
analyze the impact of key model parameters on the pricing and sales
patterns as well as profits through sensitivity analysis.
7. Numerical study
In this section, we perform sensitivity analysis by focusing on
some key model parameters. We not only look at how the optimal
price and referral payment paths change when the parameter values
change, but investigate their impact on profit and sales. Furthermore,
we quantify the benefit of adopting referral marketing over the base
model without referral marketing. Although parameter values in
this numerical study are chosen for illustrative convenience, their
combination is comprehensive enough to represent typical scenarios
of interest. The parametric choices enable us to present major qualita-
tive insights of our analytical models.
7.1. Sensitivity analysis on key parameters
Recall that α, β, and γ are parameters that affect the conditional
probabilities of purchase, and θ and s affect the demand rate. Fig. 2
compares the price and referral payment dynamics under both the
linear and the nonlinear demand models when these key parameters
change. The base model is N=10, T=10, s=0.5, θ=0.1, α=0.1,
γ=0.05, and γ/β=0.5. The total cumulative sales and discounted
profit are recorded in Table 3.
We see that when the coefficient of innovation α increases, the
initial price increases but the initial referral payment decreases
under the linear demand dynamics. In contrast, although the initial
price increases, the referral payment keeps unchanged under the
nonlinear demand dynamics. Both the discounted profit and the cu-
mulative sales increase under both demand assumptions. This implies
that the referral payment should decrease as the market innovation
effect becomes stronger.
When the coefficient of imitation γ decreases, the price variation
decreases over the entire product planning horizon, and the referral
payment increases under the linear demand assumption. In compari-
son, although the price variation decreases under the nonlinear de-
mand assumption, the referral payment decreases rather than
increases. Both the discounted profit and the cumulative sales de-
crease under both demand dynamics. The intuition is that, although
the optimal referral payment may increase or decrease under differ-
ent demand assumptions, the seller will make less profit and sales if
the market WOM effect is weak.
When the demand sensitivity coefficient θ or the demand elastic-
ity s increases, both price and referral payment tend to decrease. The
discounted profit and the cumulative sales decrease as well. The same
trend is observed for both the linear and nonlinear demand dynamics.
7.2. With or without online referral marketing
In this section, we show that the benefit of adopting the online re-
ferral marketing varies across different parameters that affect the
market dynamics. Table 4 compares cases under three lengths of the
selling horizon (T={5, 10, 20}), three levels of initial adoption (x(0)
or z(0) ={0, 20%N, 50%N}), and two market sizes (N={10, 100}).
The relative WOM γ/α={0.1, 1}, representing low or high effect,
and the coefficient of referral β={0.0005, 0.005, 0.05}, representing
low, medium, and high effects. We present four operational charac-
teristics including switching time (T_Switch), sales peak time
(T_Peak), final market share measured by total cumulative sales di-
vided by total market size (S_Percent), and profit ratio measured by
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Fig. 1. Comparison of pricing and sales patterns: linear vs. nonlinear demand dynamics.
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total discounted profit of the referral marketing model divided by
that of the base model (P_Ratio).
We observe that generally large market shows greater benefit
than smaller market. In addition, the referral marketing model is
more efficient in large market with high WOM effect, especially
when the initial market is not well developed and when theWOM re-
sponse to referral is not weak. It can yield as high as 25 times more of
the total profit than that in the base model (see P_Ratio in the Table).
Due to the intense market competition, many types of consumer
products have very short life cycles. Our numerical results show
that the referral marketing strategy can generate more profit than
the base model when the selling horizon is short.
8. Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper we theoretically analyze the optimal pricing and re-
ferral reward strategies under different demand side dynamics. Al-
though the sales patterns are similar, we find the price and referral
payment strategies differ dramatically. If the seller decides not to em-
ploy an online referral marketing program, then a myopic seller
would adopt a constant pricing strategy under the nonlinear demand
dynamics and a monotonic decreasing pricing strategy under the lin-
ear demand dynamics. The forward-looking pricing pattern critically
depends on the ratio of the innovation coefficient and the imitation
coefficient. If the ratio is small (i.e., the imitation effect is strong), a
forward-looking seller would prefer a penetration pricing policy in
which price first increases and then decreases.
Under the fixed product price, if the seller decides to employ a re-
ferral marketing strategy, then the myopic referral payment policy is
a static policy under both the linear and the nonlinear demand
dynamics. In contrast to their different pricing strategies, the myopic
seller would adopt the same referral policy. The forward-looking re-
ferral strategy is similar under different demand dynamics. Generally,
the optimal referral payment would decrease in initial phase of mar-
ket development but increase near the end of the selling horizon. This
is in sharp contrast with the myopic strategy.
If both price and referral strategies change over time, then a myo-
pic seller would choose the rate of change in referral payment as half
of the rate of change in price under both the linear and the nonlinear
demand dynamics. A forward-looking seller's optimal strategy criti-
cally depends on the demand assumptions. Under the nonlinear de-
mand dynamics, if the demand is responsive to referral payment,
then it is optimal to adopt a referral marketing program throughout
the entire planning period. Moreover, the optimal referral payment
increases over time. If the demand is not responsive enough, then it
is optimal not to adopt the referral marketing campaign. Under the
linear demand assumption, the prediction is quite different. The re-
ferral payment can be decreasing. More importantly, offering referral
payment is not an all-or-nothing decision. It can be optimal to only
adopt referral marketing in initial phase of product introduction but
rely on traditional WOM marketing for the rest of the product life
cycle.
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Table 3
Sales and profit under linear and nonlinear demand.
Demand
dynamics
Discounted profit Cumulative sales
Base α↑ γ↓ θ(s)↑ Base α↑ γ↓ θ(s)↑
Linear 46.12 54.07 26.83 20.28 8.49 8.78 4.97 7.76
Nonlinear 9.98 14.89 4.41 3.86 7.66 8.24 3.23 6.49
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Our model also offers several managerial insights. Our numerical
studies show that the referral marketing strategy has great potential
in large markets with strong WOM effect, especially for short life
cycle products when the initial market is not developed.
One limitation of this study is that we do not consider the consu-
mer's willingness to make referral and the behavior of a referred cus-
tomer. We only take into account the effects of price and referral
reward on the probabilities of buying and referring. In reality, a re-
ferred customer makes a purchasing decision when the surplus
from buying is nonnegative. A customer makes a recommendation
when the expected surplus from recommending the product exceeds
the cost of referring other consumers. In future study, we may endo-
genize these decision factors and build models based on consumer
utility theory. In addition, real world data can be collected to validate
our model predictions.
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Appendix A. Notation table
Appendix B. Proof of Table 2
1) The linear demand dynamics:
Under the myopic pricing strategy, the monopolist maximizes the
instantaneous profit. The optimization problem under linear demand
dynamics can be expressed as:
Max
p tð Þ
p tð Þx˙ tð Þ
s:t: x˙ tð Þ ¼ αþ γx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þ−θp tð Þð Þ
ð10Þ
Solving for p(t) we obtain pml tð Þ ¼ N−x tð Þ2θ .
Substituting plm(t) into x˙ tð Þ and separating variables yields
∫
x
0
2dx tð Þ
αþγx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ ¼ ∫
t
0
dt. Using the method of partial fraction to inte-
grate the left-hand-side, wewrite 1αþγx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ ¼ Aαþγx tð Þ þ BN−x tð Þ, where
A ¼ 1Nþαγ, B=
1
αþγN. Since
1
αþγN ∫
x
0
dγx
αþγx ¼ 1αþγN ln αþ γxð Þ, 1αþγN ∫
x
0
dx
N−x ¼
− 1αþγN ln N−xð Þ, we have ∫
x
0
2dx tð Þ
αþγx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ ¼ 2αþγN lnαþγxN−x . Therefore,
ln αþγxN−x ¼ αþγN2 t þ cð Þ. Or, αþγxN−x ¼ Ke
αþγN
2 t . Since x(0)=0, we have
K ¼ αN. Solving the equation for x(t) we have x tð Þ ¼ 1−e
− αþγNð Þt2
1
N þγαe
− αþγNð Þt2
.
Substituting x(t) into plm(t) we have pml tð Þ ¼ N2θ − 1−e
− αþγNð Þt2
2θ 1N þγαe
− αþγNð Þt2
 .
Since the diffusion rate is at a maximum when ̈x ¼ 0, differentiat-
ing x˙ and solving for x we have xˆ
m
l ¼ N2 − α2γ.
Substituting xˆ
m
l into x(t) we find the sales peak time tˆ
m
l ¼ 2ln
γN
α
αþγN.
2) The nonlinear demand dynamics:
Under the myopic pricing strategy, the optimization problem is:
Max
p tð Þ
p tð Þx˙ tð Þ
s:t: x˙ tð Þ ¼ e−sp tð Þ αþ γx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ
ð11Þ
Solving for p(t) we obtain pmn ¼ 1s.
Substituting pnm into x˙ tð Þ and separating variables yields
∫
x
0
edx tð Þ
αþγx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ ¼ ∫
t
0
dt. Using the method of partial fraction to inte-
grate the left-hand-side, we write 1αþγx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ ¼ Aαþγx tð Þ þ BN−x tð Þ,
where A ¼ 1Nþαγ, B=
1
αþγN. Since
1
αþγN ∫
x
0
dγx
αþγx ¼ 1αþγN ln αþ γxð Þ,
Table 4
Comparison of referral marketing model vs. the base model.
Initial z(0) Metrics Small Mkt/High WOM/High β Large Mkt/High WOM/Medium β Large Mkt/Low WOM/Low β
(x(0)) T=5 10 20 T=5 10 20 T=5 10 20
0 T_Switch NA NA 11.68 NA NA 16.47 NA NA NA
T_Peak 5.0 4.18 3.83 1.28 1.28 1.29 5.0 10.0 4.29
(3.06) (4.59) (5.61) (3.25) (4.42) (14.86) (5.0) (10.0) (0)
S_Percent 0.88 0.69 0.92 0.85 0.94 0.98 0.36 0.57 0.82
(0.49) (0.55) (0.88) (0.04) (0.26) (0.72) (0.12) (0.21) (0.43)
P_Ratio 1.42 1.24 1.19 25.51 9.70 6.71 1.79 1.77 1.66
20%N T_Switch NA NA 8.26 NA NA 15.21 NA NA NA
T_Peak 5.0 0.61 0.61 0.1 0.07 0.14 5.0 0.61 0.41
(5.0) (3.27) (2.45) (3.27) (6.19) (13.66) (3.67) (0) (0)
S_Percent 0.62 0.79 0.95 0.88 0.95 0.99 0.56 0.72 0.86
(0.53) (0.75) (0.94) (0.47) (0.70) (0.92) (0.31) (0.41) (0.58)
P_Ratio 1.19 1.11 1.11 2.80 2.25 2.19 2.43 2.13 2.00
50%N T_Switch NA 4.06 3.87 NA NA 13.33 NA NA NA
T_Peak 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
S_Percent 0.77 0.89 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.99 0.72 0.81 0.90
(0.76) (0.88) (0.97) (0.74) (0.87) (0.97) (0.58) (0.65) (0.76)
P_Ratio 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.77 1.59 1.60 2.17 1.91 1.82
Parameters Interpretation
α Coefficient of innovation
γ Coefficient of imitation
β Coefficient of referral
θ Demand responsiveness to price in the liner demand model, θN0
s Price elasticity in the nonlinear demand model
ρ Discount rate for profit
N The population size (or maximum market potential)
x(t) Cumulative sales in the traditional WOM marketing model
x˙ tð Þ Instantaneous sales rates in the traditional WOM marketing model
y(t) Cumulative referral-based sales in the referral marketing model
y˙ tð Þ Instantaneous referral-based sales rates in the referralmarketingmodel
z(t) Total cumulative sales in the referral marketing model
ż(t) Total instantaneous sales in the referral marketing model
p(t) Per unit selling price
m(t) Per unit referral payment in referral marketing model
T Finite planning horizon
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1
αþγN ∫
x
0
dx
N−x ¼− 1αþγN ln N−xð Þ, we have ∫
x
0
edx tð Þ
αþγx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ ¼ eαþγN
ln αþγxN−x . Therefore, ln
αþγx
N−x ¼ αþγNe t þ cð Þ. Or, αþγxN−x ¼ Ke
αþγN
e t . Since x
(0)=0, we have K ¼ αN. Solving the equation for x we obtain
xmn tð Þ ¼ 1−e
−αþγNe t
1
N þγαe−
αþγN
e t
.
The maximum penetration rate occurs at ̈x ¼ 0, differentiating x˙
and solving for x we have xˆ
m
n ¼ N2 − α2γ.
Substituting xˆ
m
n into xn
m(t) we have tˆ
m
n ¼ eαþγN ln γNα .
Appendix C. Proof of propositions
Without causing confusion, we suppress the time argument in the
following proofs when appropriate.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1 immediately follows from the calculation of
the optimal myopic prices under the linear and nonlinear demand dy-
namics in Table 2.
Proof of Proposition 2
a) The optimization problem under the linear demand dynamics
is:
Max
p tð Þ;m tð Þ
∫
T
0
e−ρtp tð Þx˙ tð Þdt
s:t: x˙ tð Þ ¼ αþ γx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þ−θp tð Þð Þ
ð12Þ
Define the current value Hamiltonian of the optimization problem
as
H x; p;λl; tð Þ ¼ pþ λlð Þ αþ γxð Þ N−θp−xð Þ; ð13Þ
where λl is the costate variable.
Without discount of profit, the first order condition with respect
to λl yields
λ˙ l ¼− pþ λlð Þ−αþ γ N−θp−2xð Þ½ : ð14Þ
The first order necessary condition for price satisfies p ¼ N−x−λlθ2θ . Fur-
thermore, p˙ ¼− 12θ x˙ þ λ˙θ
 
¼ − 12θ N−x−θpð Þ 2α−γ N−θp−ð½ 3xÞ.
Therefore, p˙N0 when 2α−γ(N−θp−3x)b0. That is, if xb N−θp3 − 2α3γ,
then p˙N0 and the optimal price increases; if xN N−θp3 − 2α3γ, then p˙b0
and the optimal price decreases. The conditionαb γN2 is obtained by exam-
ining the necessary condition N−θp3 − 2α3γ N0.
b) The optimization problem under the nonlinear demand
dynamics is:
Max
p tð Þ;m tð Þ
∫
T
0
e−ρtp tð Þx˙ tð Þdt
s:t: x˙ tð Þ ¼ e−sp tð Þ αþ γx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ
ð15Þ
Define the current value Hamiltonian of the optimization problem
as
H x; p;λn; tð Þ ¼ pþ λnð Þe−sp αþ γxð Þ N−xð Þ; ð16Þ
where λn is the costate variable.
Without discount of profit, the system dynamics is controlled by
the following system of differential equations:
λ˙n ¼−e−sp pþ λnð Þ −αþ γ N−2xð Þð Þ ð17Þ
x˙ ¼ e−sp αþ γxð Þ N−xð Þ ð18Þ
The first order necessary condition for price satisfies
p ¼ 1
s
−λn: ð19Þ
Combining Eqs. (17), (18), and (19) we have
λ˙n
x˙
¼− γ N−2xð Þ−α
s αþ γxð Þ N−xð Þ : ð20Þ
By integration and solving for λ, we get λn tð Þ ¼ 1s ln αþγx Tð Þð Þ N−x Tð Þð Þαþγx tð Þð Þ N−x tð Þð Þ .
Differentiating Eq. (19) with respect to t we get p˙ ¼− λ˙n.
Substituting Eqs. (19) into (17) yields
λ˙n ¼−e−sp
1
s
−αþ γ N−2xð Þ½ : ð21Þ
Examining the sign in Eq.(21) and the fact that p˙ ¼−λ˙n we have
the results for the pricing pattern. The condition αbγN is obtained by
examining the necessary condition 12 N− αγ
 
N0.
Proof of Proposition 3
The myopic policy maximizes the instantaneous profit subject to
the demand dynamics (2) and (4). The optimization problem under
the linear demand dynamics is:
Max
m tð Þ
pz˙ tð Þ−m tð Þy˙ tð Þ
s:t: z˙ tð Þ ¼ αþ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þð Þ N−z tð Þ−θpð Þ
y˙ tð Þ ¼ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ N−z tð Þ−θpð Þ
ð22Þ
The optimization problem under the nonlinear demand dynamics
is
Max
m tð Þ
pz˙ tð Þ−m tð Þy˙ tð Þ
s:t: z˙ tð Þ ¼ e
−sp αþ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þð Þ N−z tð Þð Þ
y˙ tð Þ ¼ e−sp γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ N−z tð Þð Þ
ð23Þ
Write the first order condition with respect to m(t) we find that
the myopic referral in Eqs. (22) and (23) are the same as follows:
mml tð Þ ¼ mmn tð Þ ¼
p
2
− γ
2β
: ð24Þ
Proof of Proposition 4
a) The linear demand dynamics:
Define the current value Hamiltonian of the optimization problem
as:
H z;m; μl; tð Þ ¼ pþ μlð Þ αþ γþ βmð Þzð Þ N−z−θpð Þ
−m γþ βmð Þz N−z−θpð Þ;
ð25Þ
where μl is the costate variable.
The first order necessary condition for referral m(t) satisfies
m tð Þ ¼ pþ μl tð Þ
2
− γ
2β
: ð26Þ
Substituting m(t) into the necessary condition for optimality we
have
μ˙ l ¼ ρμl−
∂H
∂z
¼ ρμl− −
α
β
γþ 2βm þ 1
β
γþ βm 2 N−θp−2zð Þ	 
:
ð27Þ
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By integration we derive
μl ¼ ∫
T
t
e−ρ τ−tð Þ −α
β
γþ 2βm þ 1
β
γþ βm 2 N−θp−2zð Þ	 
dτ: ð28Þ
Setting μ˙ l ¼ 0 we have the switching point uniquely determined
by
z˜ l ¼
N−θp
2
−2β ρμ l þ θpþ μ lð Þαð Þ
γþ β θpþ μ lð Þð Þ2
: ð29Þ
Denote the inverse function as Z−1. The terminal condition μl(T)=
0 and z Tð ÞN N−θp2 imply that μ˙ l Tð ÞN0.
Under mild condition N≥θpþ αγ (this condition will easily hold
when the market is sufficiently large) we can verify that
1
β γþ βmð Þ γþ βmð Þ N−θpð Þ−α½ −αmN0. Therefore, if μ l(0)≤0, by
(27) we have μ˙ l 0ð Þb0. Since μl is continuous on [0, T], there must
exist t˜∈ 0; Tð Þ such that μ˙ l t˜
  ¼ 0.
If μl(0)N0, then μl Z−1 N−θp2
  
¼ ∫
T
0
e−ρ τ−Z
−1 N−θp
2ð Þð Þ − αβ γþ 2βmð Þ
h i
dτb0 implies that there exists

t∈ 0; Z−1 N−θp2
  
such that
μ˙ l tð Þ ¼
μ Z−1 N−θp2ð Þð Þ−μ 0ð Þ
Z−1 N−θp2ð Þ−0 b0. Since μ˙ l

t
 
b0 and ˙μ l Tð ÞN0, there exists
t˜∈ t ; Tð Þ such that μ˙ l t˜
  ¼ 0.
b) The nonlinear demand dynamics:
Define the current value Hamiltonian of the optimization problem
as:
H z;m; μ n; tð Þ ¼ pþ μnð Þe−sp αþ γþ βmð Þzð Þ N−zð Þ
−me−sp γþ βmð Þz N−zð Þ;
ð30Þ
where μn is the costate variable.
The first order necessary condition for referral m(t) satisfies
m tð Þ ¼ pþ μ n
2
− γ
2β
: ð31Þ
Substituting m(t) into the necessary condition for optimality we
have
μ˙ n ¼ ρμ n−
∂H
∂z
¼ ρμn−e−sp −
α
β
γþ 2βm þ 1
β
γþ βm 2 N−2zð Þ	 
: ð32Þ
By integration we derive
μn ¼ ∫
T
t
e−sp−ρ τ−tð Þ −α
β
γþ 2βm þ 1
β
γþ βm 2 N−2zð Þ	 
dτ: ð33Þ
Setting μ˙ n ¼ 0 we have the switching point uniquely determined
by
z˜n ¼
N
2
−2β e
spρμn þ pþ μnð Þα
 
γþ β pþ μnð Þð Þ2
: ð34Þ
The terminal condition μn(T)=0 and z Tð ÞN N2 imply that μ˙ n Tð ÞN0.
Under mild condition N≥ αγ we can verify that − αβ
γþ 2βmð Þ þ 1β γþ βmð Þ2NN0. Therefore, if μn(0)≤0, by Eq. (32) we
have μ˙ n 0ð Þb0. Since μ n is continuous on [0, T], there must exist
t˜∈ 0; Tð Þ such that μ˙ n t˜
  ¼ 0.
If μn(0)N0, then μ n Z−1 N2
   ¼ ∫T
0
e−sp−ρ τ−Z
−1 N
2ð Þð Þ − αβ γþ 2βmð Þ
h i
dτb0, there exists

t∈ 0; Z−1 N2
  
such that μ˙ l tð Þ ¼
μ Z−1 N2ð Þð Þ−μ 0ð Þ
Z−1 N2ð Þ−0 b0.
Since μ˙ l tð Þb0 and μ˙ l Tð ÞN0, there exists t˜∈

t ; T
 
such that μ˙ l t˜
  ¼ 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Under the linear demand dynamics, a myopic seller chooses opti-
mal p(t) andm(t) simultaneously to optimize the instantaneous prof-
it rate in the following objective function:
p tð Þ αþ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þð Þ N−z tð Þ−θp tð Þð Þ
−m tð Þ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ N−z tð Þ−θp tð Þð Þ:
ð35Þ
First order conditions with respect to p(t) and m(t) yield:
N−z tð Þ þm tð Þ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ
αþ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ ¼ 2θp tð Þ
m tð Þ ¼ p tð Þ
2
− γ
2β
8><
>: ð36Þ
We have m˙ tð Þ ¼ p˙ tð Þ2 .
Similarly, under the nonlinear demand dynamics, a myopic seller
chooses optimal p(t) andm(t) simultaneously to optimize the follow-
ing instantaneous profit rate:
p tð Þe−sp tð Þ αþ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ½  N−z tð Þð Þ
−m tð Þe−sp tð Þ γþ βm tð Þð Þz tð Þ N−z tð Þð Þ:
ð37Þ
First order conditions with respect to p(t) and m(t) yield:
p tð Þ ¼ 1
s
1−
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
β2z tð Þ2 þ 4αs2 αþ γz tð Þð Þ
q
−2αs−γsz tð Þ
βz tð Þ
2
4
3
5
m tð Þ ¼ p tð Þ
2
− γ
2β
8>><
>>:
ð38Þ
Hence, we have m˙ tð Þ ¼ p˙ tð Þ
2
.
Proof of Proposition 6
Define the current value Hamiltonian of the optimization problem
(Eq. 6) as
H ¼ pþ ϕnð Þe−sp αþ γþ βmð Þz½  N−zð Þ−me−sp γþ βmð Þz N−zð Þ: ð39Þ
The system dynamics is determined by the following two differen-
tial equations:
ϕ˙n ¼−e−sp N−2zð Þ γþ βmð Þ pþ ϕn−mð Þ−α pþ ϕnð Þ½  ð40Þ
z˙ ¼ e−sp N−zð Þ αþ γþ βmð Þz½  ð41Þ
The necessary conditions for optimal price and referral are given
by
p tð Þ ¼ 1
s
−ϕn−
2α
βz
−γ
β
þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
β2z2 þ 4αs2 αþ γzð Þ
q
sβz
m tð Þ ¼ pþ ϕn
2
− γ
2β
:
8>><
>>:
ð42Þ
Differentiating p(t) and m(t) with respect to t, we have
p˙ tð Þ ¼−ϕ˙n þ
2α
βz2
1− sγzþ 2sαffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
β2z2 þ 4αs2 αþ γzð Þ
q
0
B@
1
CAz˙
m˙ tð Þ ¼ p˙
2
þ ϕ˙n
2
¼ α
βz2
1− sγzþ 2sαffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
β2z2 þ 4αs2 αþ γzð Þ
q
0
B@
1
CAz˙
:
8>>>><
>>>>:
ð43Þ
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Substituting p(t) into the expression of m(t) in Eq. (42) we have
m tð Þ ¼
βz−2sα−2sγzþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
β2z2 þ 4αs2 αþ γzð Þ
q
2sβz
: ð44Þ
Based on Eq. (4), the constraint m(t)N0 requires that βNsγ. If
β≤sγ, then m=0. We can further verify that, when βNsγ, the coeffi-
cient before ż is positive. Therefore, m˙ tð ÞN0.
Substituting Eq. (44) into Eq. (40) and rearrange terms we have
ϕ˙n ¼−e−sp N−2zð Þ
β2 pþ ϕnð Þ2 þ γ2
4β
þ pþ ϕnð Þ
N−2zð Þγ
2
−α
 " #
:
ð45Þ
Based on Eq. (42) we have p þ ϕn ¼ 2m þ γβ. Substituting Eq. (4)
into the expression, together with the condition βNsγ we can verify
that p+ϕnN0. From Eq. (45) we see that ϕ˙nb0 when p+ϕnN0 and
z tð Þ≤ N2 − αγ. Since the term 2αβz2 1− sγzþ2sαffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiβ2z2þ4αs2 αþγzð Þp
 
z˙≥0, we con-
clude from Eq. (43) that the optimal price p˙ tð ÞN0.
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